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FEDERAL LABOR LAW: ADMnISTRATVE RECESSION
Legislative Forms
The sphere in which a state government may properly operate
without infringing upon federal jurisdiction presents a problem
which is neither novel nor unique in our legal history.- Such
problems will not be uncommon as long as our dual system of
sovereignty endures; however, in the interest of consistency and
expeditious justice our objective should be to minimize questions
which deter parties from petitioning the proper forum. If there
has been an infringment it matters not whether the state action
was taken by the legislature 2 its judiciary,3 or an administrative
agency.4
Once Congress has enacted legislation regulating an activity,
the question of whether or not residuum has been left, upon
which a state may exercise jurisdiction, presents numerous and
varied legal issues. Federal legislation may have the effect of con-
ferring jurisdiction upon the state judiciary, thereby making it
mandatory that a state court open its doors to litigants;5 it may
give the state judiciary concurrent jurisdiction;6 or it may alto-
gether preclude the state courts from exercising jurisdiction.7
A provision in the Constitution, e.g., the interstate commerce
clause,8 may in and of itself prohibit state action.9
The inquiry made herein is primarily concerned with the Taft-
Hartley Act,l0 and its predecessor the Wagner Act, "with refer-
ence to those situations wherein their ultimate effect has been
to preclude state courts from resolving issues in labor cases. It
must be assumed that any particular case is concerned with an
I Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
2 Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
3 Kansas City S. Ry. v. Kaw Valley Dist., 233 U.S. 75 (1914).
4 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State LRB, 330 U.S. 767 (1947).
5 Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
6 Ibid.
7 Garner v. Teamsters, C. & H. Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
8 U.S. CosT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
9 See e.g. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 326 U.S. 761
(1945).
10 Labor Management Relations Act, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 US.C.
§§ 141-188 (1952).




industry "affecting commerce"'12 as those terms are defined by
the National Labor Relations Act. Insofar as the federal legisla-
tion in this area depends upon the commerce clause for its con-
stitutionality, it will not be amiss to concern ourselves with other
commerce cases, though they be non-labor cases.
Supreme Law or Not?
The supremacy clause13 of the Constitution makes it incumbent
upon state judges as well as federal judges to abide by Congres-
sional power which is constitutionally exerted. The confusion
engendered in domestic law has proved to be no obstacle in the
domain of foreign affairs.14 Federal legislation, when enacted,
demands no less respect by a state legislature, judiciary, or ad-
ministrative agency, than that given to an international treaty
or executive agreement. Nor does disagreement with the wisdom
of Congress in enacting a particular statute provide a reason for
ignoring the words and policy embodied in that statute.15 The
gravamen is primarily one of legislative power exercised pursu-
ant to the Constitution. The exercise of that power in the area
of labor relations has been held valid.'6
Though Congress must clearly manifest an intent to occupy a
field in order to preclude a state from asserting jurisdiction, 7
the nature of the legislation and its subject matter may imply
such an intent on the part of Congress as to exclude state action
though it does not expressly so state.'8 The real import of Con-
12 61 STAT. 138 § 2(7) defines "affecting commerce" as ". . . in com-
merce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce,
or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstruct-
ing commerce or the free flow of commerce."
13 U. S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2: "This Constitution, and the laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; . . .shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding."
14 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942): "A treaty is a 'Law
of the Land' under the supremacy clause . .. of the Constitution. Such
international compacts and agreements as the Litvinov Assignment have
a similar dignity."
15 See Ratner, Problems of Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor Relations,
NEw -YORK UNIVERSITY FIFTH ANNUAL CoNFERENcE ON LABOR 77, 93 (1952).
16 NLRB v. Jones &-Laughlin Steel Corp. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
17 Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S.
137 (1902).
1- Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State LRB, 330 U.S. 767 (1947);
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52 (1941); Napier. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.,
272 U.S. 605 (1926).
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gressional action, once it has been taken, was well stated by Chief
Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland:9
... the States have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard,
impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the
constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the
powers vested in the general government. This is ... the unavoid-
able consequence of that supremacy which the constitution has
declared.
Nor may a state burden interstate commerce under the guise of
its police power.20 However, when Congress in a particular statute
does not make federal jurisdiction exclusive, any state court of
competent jurisdiction may hear and decide a case arising there-
under. In fact, there may arise a positive duty on the part of
state courts to entertain jurisdiction over the federal cause of
action where the act does not give exclusive jurisdiction to the
federal courts and the state court is otherwise competent.2 ' In
the latter situation neither public policy nor police power of the
state will aid it in attempting to decline jurisdiction.
2 2
Speaking correlatively, when Congress in its wisdom vests
exclusive jurisdiction not only in the federal courts but likewise
in an administrative agency, there devolves upon state courts
and agencies the duty to decline jurisdiction and leave the parties
to pursue their federal remedies.2 3 Expression of, and adherence
to this duty appears in Gerry v. Superior Court:24
The provisions of the 1947 Act (Labor Management Relations Act]
show an intent to preserve the functional purposes of the National
Labor Relations Act with increased objectives, and an intent not to
confer powers on the courts at the suit of private parties with the
exception of the jurisdiction expressly granted, which does not in-
clude the exercise of equity powers. (Emphasis added.)
Likewise when the Supreme Court of the United States construes
a provision of the Constitution or a federal statute, a federal
19 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
20 Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373 (1946).
21 Mondou v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R.R., 223 U.S. 1 (1911). See Claflin v.
Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876): "The laws of the United States are laws
in the several States, and just as much binding on the citizens and courts
thereof as the State laws are. The United States is not a foreign sovereignty
as regards the several States, but is a concurrent, and, within its jurisdic-
tion, paramount sovereignty."
22 See notes 5 and 20 supra.
23 Gerry v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 119, 194 P.2d 689 (1948); Norris
Grain Co. v. Nordaas, 232 Minn. 91, 46 N.W.2d 94 (1951); Costaro v. Simons,
302 N.Y. 318, 98 N.E.2d 454 (1951). Cf. Sommer v. Metal Trades Council,
40 Cal. 2d 254, 254 P. 2d 559 (1953).
24 32 Cal. 2d 119, 194 P.2d 689, 694 (1948).
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question has been determined and their construction is to be
followed by the state courts.25 This duty is not to be lightly
regarded 26 though there is abundant evidence of indifference on
the part of state judges and administrators 27 in following those
decisions.
It is of interest to note that in Gerry v. Superior Court, supra,
argument was made by counsel that since the National Act was
a part of the supreme law of the land it was incumbent upon the
state court to enforce and protect rights given thereby. Such an
argument would need be given great weight had not Congress,
when it enacted the National Labor Relations Act also made
provision for the National Board empowering it to prevent unfair
labor practices and to cede jurisdiction by agreement, pursuant
to Section 10 (a) of the Act. The late Senator Taft, one of the
primary authors of the amendment, was well aware of the power
placed at the Board's disposal. 2S Representative Hartley stated
that ". . . by the Labor Act Congress preempts the field that the
25 Wichita Falls & S.R.R. v. Lodge No. 1476 ..... Tex. 266 S.W.2d
265, 269 (1954): "... in the field of Federal-state relations we are bound by
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court."
26 Johnson v. United States, 163 Fed. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908) per Justice
Homes: "A statute may indicate or require as its justification a change in
the policy of the law, although it expresses that change only in the specific
cases most likely to occur to the mind. The Legislature has the power to
decide what the policy of the law shall be, and if it has intimated its will,
however indirectly, that will should be recognized and obeyed. The major
premise of the conclusion expressed in a statute, the change of policy that
induces the enactment, may not be set out in terms, but it is not an adequate
discharge of duty for the courts to say: We see what you are driving at,
but you have not said it, and therefore we shall go on as before."
27 Coutlakis v. State, 268 S.W.2d 192,197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1954): "It is the
natural inclination of State courts of last resort to uphold the legality of
the acts of their Legislatures, primarily because the members thereof are
ardent proponents of the rights of the States. However, by the same token
as we require inferior courts to accede to our views of the law, we
should be ready to accept the holdings of the court to which our cases may
be appealed. An accused should not be required to appeal to a superior court
when that superior court has already spoken." (Dissenting opinion). Com-
pare the majority opinion with Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538
(1945). See Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin ERB, 338 U.S. 953 (1950),
reversing per curiam, 255 Wis. 285, 38 N.W2d 688 (1949).
28 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr OF
1947, 1031 (1948):
Mr. IVES. I desire to say for the Record that right now we have a good
National Labor Relations Board; and I think the senior Senator from Ohio
will agree with me in that statement.
Mr. TAFT. I do agree, otherwise I would not be willing to grant them
the great additional powers we give them in the... bilL
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Act covers insofar as commerce within the meaning of the Act is
concerned.... ."-9 Nor were other legislators oblivious of the evil
that was sought to be remedied by the Act of 1947.30 The Court
in Garner v. Teamsters, C. & H. Union, 31 placed great emphasis on
the power which Congress had vested in the Board.
A literal reading of the supremacy clause would lead one to
believe that any state legislation or action would need be "con-
trary" to federal legislation before the state could be precluded
from asserting jurisdiction. It is submitted that such a conclusion
is not the weight of authority because literalness is not a true
criterion of intent. All rules of construction are subordinate to
that intent,32 and when we speak of construing the Constitution
we must ascertain what it has come to be.33 The same rules are
applicable in interpreting the Constitution as are those in con-
struing Congressional legislation. Mr. Justice Holmes stated the
rule in Charleston & W. Carolina R.R. v. Varnville Co.3 4 to be:
When Congress has taken the particular subject-matter in hand
coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and a state law is not to
be declared a help because it attempts to go farther than Congress
has seen fit to go.
Similar language used by Mr. Justice Washington in Houston v.
Moore,35 would seem to be strong support for the doctrine advo-
cated by the preemptionists:
If an act of Congress be the supreme law of the land, it cannot be
made more binding by an affirmative re-enactment of the same act
by a State legislature. The latter must be merely inoperative and
void. (Emphasis added.)
29 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT OF
1947, 591 et seq. (1948).
30 See 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT
OF 1947, 1057 (1948).
31 346 U.S. 485, 490 (1953).
32 See SUTHERLAwD, STATUTORY CONSTRucTION §§ 4910,4914 (3d ed. 1943). Cf.
Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948). (Held the Fair Labor
Standards Act covered employees of American contractors engaged in the
construction of a military base near Bermuda leased by Britain to the
United States. There was no reference in the Act or it legislative history
as to leased areas.)
33 See generally CoRwIN, THE CONSTrrUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY
(11th rev.ed. 1954). Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1920): "We
must consider what this country has become in deciding what that [Tenth]
Amendment has reserved." Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 32 (Hamilton).
34 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915).
35 18 US. (5 Wheat.) 1, 72 (1820). (However, strong objection has been
made to the authority of the case for support of the preemption doctrine.
Petro, Participation by the States in the Enforcement and Development of
National Labor Policy, 28 NoTRE DsAm LAw. 1 (1952).)
1955] NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
The late Mr. Justice Jackson was of the same mind as Holmes
when he wrote the opinion in the Garner case: 36
... when federal power constitutionally is exerted for the pro-
tection of public or private interests, or both, it becomes the supreme
law of the land and cannot be curtailed, circumvented or extended
by a state procedure....
In that the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, is a part
of the supreme law of the land the duty necessarily falls upon
federal and state judges as well as agency administrators to abide
by its terms. Administration of the Act was not vested by Con-
gress in state common law and equity courts.7 One of the pri-
mary reasons for Congress centralizing the functions of the Act
in a single specialized agency was to assure that the Act received
a uniform interpretation. Congress was also cognizant of the fact
that to permit state courts to decide issues governed by the Act
would open the door to potential diversity, both of policy and
fact finding, which Congress, in the interest of assuring uniform-
ity, closed.8 Effectuation of this objective necessarily requires
that the Board's conclusions should not turn upon whatever
different standards the respective states may see fit to adopt. 9
What Congress and the Supreme Court foresaw as "potential
conflict," if state courts were permitted to decide issues governed
by federal law, has resulted in diversity in fact.40 The conflict
was well illustrated in H. N. Thayer,4' wherein the employer
secured from a Massachusetts state court an injunction against
the continuation of a strike on the ground that the strike was
illegally conducted for an unlawful objective. The alleged illegal
conduct consisted of mass picketing and the unlawful objective
was that under Massachusetts law a union could not strike for
recognition during the term of a contract with another union.
Thereafter the Board, on unfair labor practice charges filed by
the striking union, considered the same evidence and rejected
both the findings of the state court and its conclusions. It then
made its own determination that the strike was conducted for
36 346 U.S. 485, 500-501 (1953).
37 Cox, The Role of Law in Labor Disputes, 39 CORNELL L. Q. 592, 601
(1954). See the late Mr. Chief Justice Hughes' statement in NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937): "The ... case is not a suit
at common law or in the nature of such a suit. The proceeding is one
unknown to the common law. It is a statutory proceeding."
38 93 CONG. RIc. 4132 (1947).
39 NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
40 See Safeway Stores, Inc., 81 N.L.R.B. 387 (1949) and Eppinger &
Russell Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 1259 (1944).
41 99 NJ.R.B. 1122 (1952).
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a lawful objective, and in doing so stated: 42
We hold that in deciding the issues before us in this case this
Federal Board is in no respect bound by the decisions of the courts
of Massachusetts, either as to the legality of the purpose of the strike
or the legality of the manner in which the strike was conducted.
The Act has preempted the field of peaceful strikes affecting com-
merce....
The Board further stated: 43
Plainly, the Board is not bound by a decision as to the objectives
of the strike which the State court had no power to make. Nor is
it bound by that court's ruling respecting the character of the
means.
It is readily observable that if there is to be certainty in the law
of labor relations, and litigants are to be assured of the proper
forum to petition, the Act must be respected as long as it is law
not only by the Board and federal courts, but also by state judges
and administrators. The feeling is apparent that the doctrine of
preemption in labor law is of necessity antagonistic to the rights
and desires of the employer or management. Such a conclusion
is certainly not a truism.4 The traditional argument against the
legislation is not premised on Congress' lack of power to enact
it but on its wisdom in enacting such legislation." Such an argu-
ment, it is submitted, has no basis in law and the remedy in such
case lies with Congress and not with the Board nor the federal
or state courts. To date Congress has not seen fit to return juris-
diction, by statutory enactment, to the states. However, Congress
did, by specific provisions in the Taft-Hartley Act, deem it advis-
able to permit state regulation in certain areas of labor relations.
To these may be added those areas defined by the Supreme
42 Id. at 1129.
43 Id. at 1130. See also Hamilton v. NLRB 160 F.2d 465 (6th Cir. 1947),
cert. denied sub nom., Kalamazoo Stationery Co. v. NLRB, 332 U.S. 762
(1947); NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 874 (1st Cir. 1941),
cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941).
44 Gerry v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 119, 194 P.2d 629 (1948). See Leiter
Mg. Co. v. Internat'l Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 269 S.W.2d 409 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1954). (Here the union, relying on the state's "right to work law",
brought suit against the employer for the reinstatement of thirty-five
women who had allegedly been discharged for union membership. The
union argued that state courts have permissive jurisdiction unless and until
the National Labor Relations Board assumes jurisdiction. The court of
appeals sustained the employer's plea to the jurisdiction on the ground that
the National Board had exclusive jurisdiction.) See also Amazon Cotton
M Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 167 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1948) and Davega
City Radio, Inc. v. State LRB, 281 N.Y. 13, 22 N.E. 2d 145 (1939).
45 See note 35, Petro, op cit. supra at 66-72.
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Court's interpretation of the Act, which are listed as follows: 46
1. Section 10 (a), with specific limitations, empowers the Board
to cede jurisdiction to state or territorial agencies over predomi-
nantly local matters. Clearly, until cession is made, jurisdiction
remains in the Board. An agency cannot cede that which it does
not possess.
2. Section 14 (b) makes state law supreme providing it is more
strict on union security clauses than is the federal law.
3. Section 303 provides parties with a remedy for damages
resulting from boycotts or jurisdictional disputes and the injured
party may sue in a federal district court or any other court having
jurisdiction of the parties.
47
4. States have their traditional power to enjoin violence or
mass picketing. Though there is no express authority to this
effect in the Act it is supported by the legislative history and the
opinion of the Supreme Court.
48
5. Apparently a state court can entertain a suit for damages
resulting from conduct that also constitutes an unfair labor
practice.49
6. With some reservation it may be stated that a state court
may adjudicate controversies involving an industry whose vol-
ume of business does not meet the jurisdictional yardsticks for-
mulated by the Board. The standards will be discussed at greater
length later.50
Exhaustion of Remedies
Every state recognizes the rule that a litigant who considers
himself aggrieved by a decision made by an administrative
agency must exhaust his remedies before that agency prior to
procuring any relief from the state courts. The present inquiry
4o See Feldblum, Jurisdictional Conflicts in Regulation of Economic
Action, NEw YoRR UNIVERSITY S= ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 305,307-309
(1953). The author there lists four such areas.
47 Actions relating to secondary boycotts may be brought pursuant to
this section without regard to the amount in controversy or diversity of
citizenship. See Intl Longshoremen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S.
237 (1952); Banner Mfg. Co. v. United Furniture Workers of America, 90 F.
Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
48 Intl Union v. Wisconsin ERB, 336 U.S. 245 (1949). (Held the activity
there engaged in was neither prohibited nor protected by the Act.) See
Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin ERB, 315 U.S. 740 (1941). Though
decided before the Taft-Hartley amendment may still be valid as to violence
and mass picketing.
49 United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S.
656 (1954).
50 See NLRB Release R-449 (July 15, 1954).
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is concerned with whether or not state tribunals should recognize
and give effect to the same rule when they are petitioned to give
redress to activities which are to be determined according to the
terms of the National Act. The view here taken is that state
courts and agencies should leave the parties to pursue their
remedies before the Board or the proper federal court of juris-
diction, whichever of the two the Act empowers to hear the
controversy.
The Supreme Court has recognized and given effect to the rule.
In Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,5 ' the question pre-
sented was whether or not a federal district court had equity
jurisdiction to enjoin the Board from holding a hearing upon a
complaint charging the corporation with dominating and inter-
fering with the labor organization of its employees. Mr. Justice
Brandeis answered the question in the negative clearly stating
the reason therefor: 
52
... the rule requiring exhaustion of the administrative remedy
cannot be circumvented by asserting that the charge on which the
complaint rests is groundless and that the mere holding of the
prescribed administrative hearing would result in irreparable
damage. Lawsuits also often prove to have been groundless; but no
way has been discovered of relieving . . . from the necessity of a
trial to establish the fact.
The lower federal courts, as well as some state courts have ad-
hered to the above rule. Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile
Workers Union5 3 illustrates the point quite candidly. There suit
was instituted by the union against the employer alleging that
the latter was guilty of an unfair labor practice in refusing to
bargain, that a strike had resulted and the union had sustained
damage from loss of employment due to the strike. The relief
prayed for was an injunction requiring the employer to bargain
with the union as well as an award of damages. The employer,
in addition to the Board who had intervened, filed a motion to
dismiss the cause of action. After an extensive consideration of
the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act, the court of
appeals reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss the
cause stating: 5-
... the plaintiff [Union] has been provided an adequate admin-
istrative remedy before the Labor Board; and certainly the ex-
51 303 U.S. 41 (1938); Accord, Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock
Co. v. Schaufller, 303 U.S. 54 (1938).
52 303 U.S. at 51.
53 167 F2d 183 (4th Cir. 1948).
54 Id. at 190. See also Born v. Cease, 101 F. Supp. 473 (D.C. Alaska 1951);
Fitzgerald v. Douds, 76 F. Supp. 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
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traordinary powers of a court of equity may not be invoked until
this ... remedy has been exhausted.
It was also found that the omission of the term "exclusive" in
Section 10 (a) of the amendment relating to the power vested in
the Board, was not intended to vest courts with general jurisdic-
tion over unfair labor practices, but was intended to recognize
jurisdiction expressly vested in the courts as well as power in
the Board to cede jurisdiction to state agencies with specific
limitations. Section 10 (a) would seem to imply an express ceding
of jurisdiction by the Board in that the term "agreement" is used
in the Section. "Agreement" connotes a meeting with delibera-
tions and the setting down of the terms agreed upon. To date
no such "agreement" has been consummated by the Board and
a state agency.
The reasoning which prevents the Supreme Court or the lower
federal courts from intervening and obstructing the processes of
the Board, except by way of review or on application of the
Board, also precludes state courts from doing so.55 The same
reasoning also excludes state administrative agencies from assum-
ing control of matters placed within the competence of the
Board.56
Several state courts have recognized the duty devolving upon
them not to assume jurisdiction over cases which are subject
to the Board's jurisdiction. Conduct by the union in Costaro v.
Simons57 constituted both an unfair labor practice under the Act
as well as being tortious under New York common law. The New
York Court of Appeals held, in effect, that the complainant must
exhaust his remedies pursuant to the National Act prior to seek-
ing relief in its state courts. Having taken one step further, it was
held prior to the latter decision in Norris Grain Co. v. Nordaas 8
that conduct which contravenes state law as well as the Act pre-
cludes a state court from assuming jurisdiction in any form. This
decision would appear to be a correct statement of the law in
view of the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Garner v. Team-
sters, C. & H. Union.59
The rule of exhaustion of remedies was followed by the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania in Garner v. Teamsters, C. & H.
UnionO° in the following form:
55 Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
56 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State LRB, 330 U.S. 767 (1947).
5- 302 N.Y. 318, 98 N.E.2d 454 (1951).
58 232 Minn. 91, 46 N.W.2d 94 (1950).
59 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
60 373 Pa. 19, 94 A.2d 893,899 (1953), affId 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
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... since the plaintiff employers ... were engaged in interstate
commerce, and the charge made by them was that the defendant
Union was engaged in an activity which was unlawful under the
law of the State but which also constituted an unfair labor practice
under the provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act, and
since that act provides an adequate and complete administrative
remedy . . . the Court of Common Pleas . . . had no jurisdiction
to issue an injunctio.... (Emphasis added.)
In the very recent case of Pilot Freight Carriers v. De Perno,6'
the plaintiff applied to a state court seeking an injunction to re-
strain the defendant union, among other things, from maintain-
ing a picket line at its terminal and other places. Counsel for the
plaintiff, upon petitioning the state court, simultaneously filed
charges with the National Board alleging the defendant had en-
gaged in unfair labor practices. This procedure, however, had
unfavorable repercussions in that it placed the plaintiff in the
paradoxical position of contending in the state court that no
provision of the Act covered the controversy. Plaintiff's incon-
sistent positions were exposed by the defendant's submission to
the court of an affidavit showing the filing of the charges with
the Board. The plaintiff found himself unable to deny the affi-
davit or to reconcile its action with the position it was taking in
the state court. It was held that the plaintiff could not "have it
both ways". The court found that according to the dictates of
the Garner decision the processes initiated by the plaintiff before
the Board would have to be exhausted before the state court
could be called upon to act in the matter. The same reasoning
was relied upon in Garnon v. San Diego Building Trades Coun-
cil62 even though plaintiff's counsel had mailed a petition to the
Board asking for a determination of which union should represent
its employees and the petition apparently had been dismissed by
the Board. The state court held it had no jurisdiction to enjoin
picketing under these circumstances since the plaintiff had not
exhausted his administrative remedy.
In view of the recent abnegation on the part of the Board,
which will be discussed more fully later, some doubt may be
thrown upon the argument relating to exhaustion of remedies.
There is already some evidence that state courts and agencies
will quickly grasp the opportunity, on the basis of this abnega-
tion, to assert jurisdiction in labor cases. The Supreme Court in
Garner approved the argument that in those instances where the
Board does not assume jurisdiction the activity should be left
61 26 CCH LAB. CAs. 68,624 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954).
62 273 P.2d 686 (Cal. App. 1954).
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free, in the public interest.63 However, one would have to admit
that should it appear certain the Board would not hear a claim
then a state equity court could hear and determine the merits
of the cause. This would apparently constitute a plausible argu-
ment due to the Board's recent limitation on its own jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court has, at least by implication, recognized the
dilemma in which parties will be placed should the Board not hear
them, though the recognition was only by way of a per curiam
opinion in Building Trades Council v. Kinard Construction Co.64
as follows:
Since there has been no clear showing that respondent has applied
to the National Labor Relations Board for appropriate relief, or
that it would be futile to do so, the Court does not pass upon the
question ... whether the state court could grant its own relief
should the Board decline to exercise its jurisdiction. (Emphasis
added.)
Should a party find it futile to make application either to the
Board or a state forum he is without a remedy. The Board's
relinquishment of jurisdiction, rather than aiding parties in peti-
tioning the proper body, serves to confuse an already complicated
area.
The Garner Case
The Garner case is and will prove to be important not only for
its precise holding but as well for the reasonable inferences aris-
ing therefrom relating to federal-state jurisdictional issues. It is
foreseeable that it will be frequently cited in the future on ques-
tions relating not only to labor relations but to many situations
wherein the functions of a state and the federal government may
conflict. Its real impact will probably be greater than that of
Houston v. Moore, supra. Therefore it will not be amiss to con-
sider Garner at some length. The material facts were as follows:
The petitioners' company was engaged in the trucking business
having twenty-four employees, four of whom were members of the
respondent union. The petitioners' trucking operations formed a
link with an interstate railroad. There existed between the union
and the petitioners no controversy, labor dispute, or strike; nor
had the petitioners at any time objected to its employees becom-
ing members of the respondent union. The union, however, placed
rotating pickets, two at a time, at petitioners' loading platform.
None of the pickets were employees of the petitioners. The pickets
carried signs reading: "Local 776 Teamsters Union (AF of L)
63 See Brief for Respondent, Garner v. Teamsters, C. & H. Union, 346 U.S.
485 (1953).
64 346 U.S. 933 (1954).
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wants Employees of Central Storage & Transfer Co. to join
them to gain union wages, hours and working conditions." The
picketing was orderly and peaceful at all times, but drivers for
other freight carriers refused to cross the picket line and, since
most of petitioners' interchange of freight was with unionized
concerns, their business fell off as much as 95 percent.
If the petitioners' allegation was found to be true the union's
activity was not only unlawful under the law of Pennsylvania
but also constituted an 8 (b) (2) unfair labor practice under the
Act. The petitioners sought a decree in the trial court restraining
the picketing and the injunction was granted. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania reversed, holding the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the cause.65 On certiorari the Supreme Court
of the United States sustained the latter decision. A unanimous
Court held that the Act foreclosed the state courts from asserting
any jurisdiction whatsoever.
An interesting and ingenious argument was made by counsel
for the petitioners6 6 in the Garner case which in substance stated
that since the Board enforces only public rights the state courts
were not foreclosed from protecting the private rights of the
petitioners. Though the argument was answered in the negative,
Mr. Justice Jackson devoted ten pages of his opinion to answer-
ing it.
The Garner decision forces at least two conclusions:
1. A state may not invoke its own law against a labor activity
if there is a remedy available pursuant to the National Act and
it matters not whether the state construes its remedies as being
supplemental, concurrent, or in substitution for the National
remedy.67
2. A state may not provide a party with its form of remedy
merely because it says it is protecting a private right.68
Since Garner
There is real evidence that the administration was dissatisfied
with the result reached in the Garner case.69 Hence, numerous
65 373 Pa. 19, 94 A.2d 893 (1953).
66 Brief for Petitioners, Garner v. Teamsters, C. & H. Union, 346 US. 485
(1953).
67 346 U.S. 485,500-501: "... when federal power constitutionally is exerted
... it ... cannot be curtailed, circumvented or extended by a state procedure.
68 This conclusion may be accepted as a consequence of the supremacy
clause. Its terms make no distinction between private and public rights.
69 100 CoxG. Rmc 5518-5519, 5521, 5527 (daily ed. May 3, 1954).
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amendments have been proposed which would materially change
the Taft-Hartley Act. The most far reaching of those relating to
the question of federal-state jurisdiction was that proposed by
Senator Goldwater of Arizona. The author of the proposed
amendment, in answer to interrogating senators, admitted that
as a consequence of his amendment, a company engaging in inter-
state commerce and having plants in numerous states would be
subject to as many different laws as the various states might
enact.
70
At the foundation of Senator Goldwater's proposed amendment
was an attempted rejuvenation of the tenth amendment of the
Constitution which reserved to the states those powers not dele-
gated to the federal government nor prohibited to the states.1
On the same subject, the proposed amendment of Senator Smith
of New Jersey would have confined itself to permitting states
to regulate strikes and picketing involving utilities.72 The Sen-
ator from Arizona was of the opinion that the latter amend-
ment was too restrictive. His real objective is best illustrated in
a colloquy with Senator Douglas of Illinois: 73
Mr. DOUGLAS: In other words, the Senator from Arizona is say-
ing there shall be no national regulation of strikes, secondary boy-
cotts, picketing, and so forth, but that in these fields the States are
to have complete jurisdiction, if they so desire; is that correct?
Mr. GOLDWATER: Yes, if they so desire. There still will be
the provisions with respect to national emergencies.
A motion to recommit Senator Goldwater's amendment to the
committee on labor and public welfare was sustained by a vote of
50 to 42 with 4 abstaining.74 It should be of interest to note here
that ". . . the late Senator Taft disapproved of concurrent Fed-
eral-State jurisdiction.
7 5
Though the amendment failed to become law there remained
another mode (administratively) by which jurisdiction over labor
relations could be returned to the states, i.e., by exercise of the
Board's discretion pursuant to section 6 of the Act whereby it
may formulate jurisdictional yardsticks and refuse to assert its
jurisdiction over an industry whose volume of business does not
come within those yardsticks. Self-abnegation on the part of the
70 Id. at 5532.
7' Id. at 5529. Cf. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). (Here the
death-knell was practically dealt the tenth amendment).
72 100 CONG. REc. 5529 (daily ed. May 3, 1954).
73 100 CONG. REc. 5535 (daily ed. May 3, 1954).
74 100 CONG. REc. 5859 (daily ed. May 7, 1954).
'75 100 CONG. Rlc. 5527 (daily ed. May 3, 1954).
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Board has occurred once again.76
The terms "affecting commerce" were defined in the National
Labor Relations Act in 1935 as "... in commerce, or burdening
or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having
led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing
commerce or the free flow of commerce." 77 There has been no
statutory modification of the meaning of those terms. During the
early history of the Act it was held that two minor concerns came
within the jurisdiction of the Board.78 The only restriction on the
power of the Board to assert its jurisdiction seemed to be the self-
imposed de minimis doctrine. Subsequently the Court stated that
the volume of commerce affected in any particular case did not
constitute a material consideration.7 9 It has been held that an
obstruction which follows as well as precedes an interstate move-
ment of commerce is within the scope of the Act. 0 Nor was a
business exempt merely because it was a retail store since it
constituted an "industry" within the meaning of the Act.81 It
was also found that since an immediate situation might be repre-
sentative of many others, the total incidence of which, if left un-
checked, might well become far reaching in its harm to commerce,
the Board had jurisdiction.8 2 On a specific finding of fact, juris-:
diction was had where the business involved did 8 percent of its
sales and installation jobs outside the state and made about 33
percent of its purchases outside the state.
8 3
The issuance by the Board of the new jurisdictional standards,
rather than giving consistency to the law, has created further
problems. Naturally they have given impetus to the return of
jurisdiction to the states. This conclusion is well supported by
the removal case of Your Food Stores v. Retail Clerks Local,84
wherein the action was commenced in a state court seeking an
76 See NLRB Release R-449 (July 15, 1954). Cf, NLRB Release R-342
(Oct. 6, 1950).
77 49 Stat. 450 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 152 (7) (1952).
78 NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937) (manufacturer of
commercial "trailers"); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301
U.S. 58 (1937) (clothing manufacturer).
79 NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 606 (1939).
80 NLRB v. Townsend, 185 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
909 (1951).
8L J. L. Brandeis & Sons v. NLRB, 142 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 751 (1944), rehearing denied, 323 U.S. 815 (1944).
82 NLRB v. Mid-Co Gasoline Co., 183 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1950).
83 NLRB v. United Brotherhood, 181 F2d 126 (6th Cir. 1950), af'd, 341
U.S. 707 (1951).
84 121 F. Supp. 339 (D. N.M. 1954).
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injunction against the defendant unions, restraining them from
picketing plaintiff's premises for the alleged purpose of coercing
plaintiff's employees into joining the unions in order to retain
their employment. The state court entered a temporary restrain-
ing order and the case was removed to the federal district court.
During the hearing on the motion in the latter court the plaintiff
admitted that in the preceding year it had purchased within New
Mexico approximately 60 percent of its merchandise and pur-
chased outside the state the remaining 40 percent; and that its
imports of merchandise from other states for sale at its market
amounted to approximately $400,000. The district court held that
plaintiff's cause of action was exclusively within the power of the
Board and therefore neither the state nor the federal court had
jurisdiction. The plaintiff then rephrased its complaint and again
petitioned the state court on the theory that the picketing consti-
tuted a trespass on the employer's property. The defendant again
claimed jurisdiction in the district court relying on section 2283
of the judicial code which authorizes federal courts to stay
proceedings in a state court when necessary in aid of their juris-
diction.8 5 Over the defense of res adjudicata the district court
held that the new jurisdictional standards constituted such a
change in law as to render the defense inapplicable, as well as
stating that when the Board declines jurisdiction the state court
then has jurisdiction to grant equitable relief.86 There is evidence
that the Board does not uniformly adhere to its jurisdictional
rules.8 7 Though the Board had specifically denied jurisdiction on
charges made by the defendant in the Your Food Stores case, the
dilemma in which state courts are placed is readily observable,
especially those rendering decisions in reliance upon the Garner
case.
In Wisconsin, where numerous problems of jurisdiction in labor
relations have ariseAi, the courts have taken a less stringent view
of the new standards. In Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. v.
Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local,88 an injunction was
85 This was the procedure used in Capital Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d
848 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'd 347 U.S. 501 (1954).
86 Your Food Stores v. Retail Clerks Local, 124 F. Supp. 697, 699 (D. N.M.
1954): "Undisputably, under these new standards, no unfair labor charges
brought by either defendant Unions or the plaintiff Food Stores, would be
entertained and decided by the Board."
87 See Westport Moving & Storage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 902 (1950). (Here, the
Board took jurisdiction over an individual proprietorship which had two
employees engaged in moving and storage operations and ten employees mak-
ing packing boxes. The employer's gross annual receipts during 1949 amounted
to about $21,000).
88 276 Wis. 356, 66 N.W.2d 318 (1954).
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sought restraining picketing which had for its alleged purpose the
coercion of the employer to encourage his non-union employees
to join the union or to discharge them and hire union employees.
The state board held that the union picketing was in violation of
the state statute and thereupon filed a complaint for enforcement
of its order. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed and re-
manded with directions to dismiss stating: 8 9
It is to be noted that the standards established by the National
Board are not absolute. They are set up to guide litigants generally
in choosing the proper forum for their complaints. The true criterion
for jurisdiction is the effect of the dispute upon the welfare of the
nation through its obstruction of the free flow of the commerce, the
prevention of such obstruction being the primary purpose of the Act.
(Emphasis added.)
Some state courts which made contrary rulings prior to the
Garner case have granted motions to reconsider, based on the
Garner decision, and have reversed their previous rulings.9 0 The
Supreme Court of Missouri has ascertained a fine line of demar-
cation between state and federal jurisdiction in Anheuser-Busch,
Inc. v. Weber,91 wherein the plaintiff sought an injunction re-
straining picketing which apparently arose out of a jurisdictional
dispute. The evidence disclosed that the defendant union had
insisted upon a contract provision whereby the plaintiff would
have to refuse work to any independent contractor unless such
contractor would agree to do the work with employees who were
represented by the Machinists' Union. Also disclosed was the
announced intention of the Union to obtain agreements similar to
this from all the breweries in the St. Louis area so that under
pressure from the breweries the construction contractors would
be compelled to bargain with the Union. The court found there
was no labor dispute or unfair labor practice involved, distinguish-
ing the Garner and analogous cases. The court premised the
issuance of its injunction on the ground that the picketing was
part of an illegal conspiracy to restrain trade in contravention of
the Missouri common law and statutes. The fact that the statute
of a state or its common law has been violated woud seem to be
a distinction without substance when weighed against the supre-
macy the federal statute enjoys.
However, the Anheuser case was distinguished in Cooper
89 Id. at 322-323.
90 E.g., Grimes & Hauer, Inc. v. Pollock .... Ohio App ..... 119 N.E2d
889 (1954). (The facts were practically identical with those in Garner).
91 ... Mo...., 265 S.W2d 325 (1954), cert. granted, 75 Sup. Ct. 32 (1954),
rev'd, 23 U.S.L. Week 4150 (U.S. Mar. 28, 1955).
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Transport Co. v. Stufflebeam92 where the trial court issued an
injunction against picketing. The defense interposed was that the
Board had exclusive jurisdiction. Not only was the conduct here
violative of the Act but also a provision of the Missouri Constitu-
tion. Nevertheless the judgment of the trial court was reversed
holding that exclusive jurisdiction of the case resided with the
Board. This case would seem to be the proper law on the basis
of Garner and subsequent cases: The main detraction from the
authority of these cases would be the recently announced juris-
dictional yardsticks by the Board.
The yardsticks were grasped upon in Satin, Inc. v. Local Union
44593 in order to sustain a state court's jurisdiction. The bill asked
to restrain picketing alleged as unlawful and constituting an un-
fair labor practice in violation of both the state and federal
statutes. The court held that the 1950 jurisdictional yardsticks
were equivalent to the Board ceding jurisdiction to the states.
The fact that the state statute was not inconsistent with the Act
was also relied upon and an attempt was made to distinguish the
Garner case on the thin basis that an integral part of a transit
system was there involved. It is cases of this nature that presup-
pose state officials, judges and administrators, are free to construe
federal law in this area. Such reasoning, if carried to its logical
extreme would negative any need for a National Labor Relations
Board. The opinion expresses the fear that the antithesis of its
reasoning would permit the Act to reach every type of business
activity including the corner cigar store. There would seem to be
little doubt about the power to do so, but whether the Board
would so exercise its discretion is another question. One won-
ders whether the author of the opinion was acquainted with
Wickard v. Filbur70' where the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1938 extended federal regulation to production not intended in
any part for commerce but wholly for consumption on the farm.
Here the subject Aiatter of the controversy was 23 acres of wheat
which was to be used primarily for home consumption. The
Court stated that even if the "activity be local and ... not re-
garded as commerce, it may still... be reached by Congress if
it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate com-
merce...,95
The quaere whether a suit for damages could be maintained in
a state court even though the conduct constituted an unfair labor
92 26 CCH LAB. CAS. ff 68,488 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1954).
93 26 CCH LAB. CAS. ff 68, 508 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1954).
94 317 U.S. 111, 124-125 (1942).
95 Id. at 125.
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practice within the Act has been posed96 and was answered -in the
affirmative in United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Con-
struction Corp.97 Though the result reached, on the facts there
present is susceptible of little doubt, it is the opinion of this writer
that the interpretation of the Garner decision is erroneous: 98
To the extent that Congress prescribed preventive procedure
against unfair labor practices, that case [Garner] recognized that
the Act excluded conflicting state procedure to the same end. ...
The care we took in the Garner case to demonstrate the existing
conflict between state and federal administrative remedies in that
case was . . a recognition that if no conflict had existed, the state
procedure would have survived. The primarily private nature of
claims for damages under state law also distinguishes them in a
measure from the public nature of the regulation of future labor re-
lations under federal law. (Emphasis added.)
It is difficult to reconcile the above language with either that
used by the Supreme Court or the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania in the Garner case. The late Mr. Justice Jackson stated
that "in language almost identical to parts of the Pennsylvania
statute, it [Congress] has forbidden labor unions to exert certain
types of coercion on employees through the medium of the
employer."9 9 The Pennsylvania opinion nowhere speaks of its
law as "conflicting" with the Act. Its statement of the issue
indicates rather a close similarity between the two laws:'100
... the question recurs whether Congress intended to exclude
State action enjoining picketing which constituted an unfair labor
practice on the part of a labor organization under the provisions of
the Labor Management Relations Act, where such picketing was
unlawful also under the State law. (Emphasis added.)
It is not an unreasonable inference that pursuant to the Pennsyl-
vania law precisely the same remedy could have been given as
that by the Board. The effect of the language in the Laburnum
decision is to place the presumption in favor of the state law and
overlook the presumption of Congressional preemption in the
field regulated which was inherent in Bethlehem and Piankinton.
The Supreme Court in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,1 10 clearly
expressed this proposition. Citing the Bethlehem case, it spoke of
the Wagner Act as an instance in which Congress had acted "so
98 See Note, 27 N.Y.U.L. REv. 468 (1952).
97 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
98 Id. at 665.
99 346 U.S. at 488-489.
100 Garner v. Teamsters, C & H. Union, 373 Pa. 19, 94 A2d 893, 897 (1953).
101 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
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unequivocally as to make clear that, it intends no regulation ex-
cept its own."102
REMOVAL AND SUSPENSION OF STATE COURT
PROCEEDINGS
There are two ways in which a state court may be deprived of
asserting jurisdiction over a cause of action: 03 (1) the defendant
or defendants in the state court may have the cause removed to
the federal district court on the basis that the alleged state cause
of action is in reality a federal cause; therefore the complaint
presents a federal question; and, (2) the defendant may bring
suit in the federal court to enjoin the state court proceeding on
the ground that the state law derogates from rights given by
federal law or on the basis that the National Act has preempted
the field. The latter procedure has been availed of to enjoin state
administrative agencies from assuming jurisdiction in cases gov-
erned by the National Act vesting jurisdiction in the Board. The
following two cases will illustrate the procedures.
In Direct Transit Lines v. Local UnionA°  an original complaint
was filed by the petitioner in the state court seeking an injunction
against the union for alleged unlawful acts and also asking for
$50,000 damages. The defendant obtained a removal to the federal
district court whereupon the petitioner moved for a remand to
the state court which was denied. Thereupon the petitioner
amended its bill of complaint by deleting the paragraph in which
it sought damages and filed a second mdtion for a remand
which was also denied. The petitioner then sought a writ of
mandamus requiring the district judge to remand the action to
the state court. Denying the writ the court of appeals sustained
the district court relying upon the two basic grounds the district
court gave for its ruling:
1. there was presented a controversy affecting commerce and
a federal question was involved, so that the Act was applicable;
2. that at the time of removal of the cause to the district court
the complaint demanded $50,000 damages, bringing it within
section 303 of the Act, and thereby sustaining the jurisdiction of
the district court to try the cause.
The court of appeals agreed with the district judge that the
cause should not be remanded if it were properly removable
upon the record as it stood at the time of the filing of the petition
for removal. The court was also of the opinion that even apart
from petitioner's claim for damages the district court had jurisdic-
102 Id. at 236.
103 See note 15, Ratner op cit. supra at 112-115.
1o4 199 F.2d 89 (6th Cir. 1952).
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tion due to the controversy coming within the Act and directly
involving interstate commerce.
The second procedure was employed in' Capital Service, Inc. V.
NLRB 10 5 after a preliminary injunction had been issued by a state
court against labor unions' inducement of persons to refrain from
purchasing the corporate defendant's bakery products by picket-
ing its customers for the purpose of forcing its employees to join
one of its unions. Subsequently an unfair labor practice com-
plaint based on the same conduct of the union was issued under
the National Act. Pursuant to section 10 (1) of the Act the Board
petitioned the federal district court for an injunction restraining
the picketing by the union pending final adjudication by the
Board. The Board also sued in the same court to enjoin petitioner
from enforcing the state court injunction.
The injunction against the state court temporary injunction
was issued by the district court on the grounds that the conduct
of the union was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board
and that the state court had invaded the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Board and the district court. The action of the district court
was upheld by the Supreme Court: 108
. . .where Congress, acting within its constitutional authority,
has vested a federal agency with exclusive jurisdiction over a
subject matter and the intrusion of a state would result in conflict
of functions, the federal court may enjoin the state proceeding in
order to preserve the federal right.
In cases subject to the jurisdiction of the National Board, the
same rule precludes state administrative agencies from determin-
ing the questions involved.
A RECOMMENDATION
Twenty years have been required to develop what would seem
to be a sound and consistent body of law relating to federal-state
jurisdiction in the area of labor relations. This development has
culminated in the Garner case with which it is difficult to find
serious fault on the basis of the statute. To have uniformity in
the law, especially as to what body is the proper forum to peti-
tion, is an interest which is of advantage both to management and
labor. The Supreme Court has recognized that ".... uncertainty
as to which [tribunal] is master and how long it will remain
105 204 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 501 (1954). Cf. Amalgamated
Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co., 211 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1954), aff'd,
23 U.S.. Week 4165 (U.S. April 5,1955).
106 347 U.S. at 504.
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such can be as disruptive of peace between industrial factions as
actual competition between two [tribunals] for supremacy." 107
However, there has been bi-partisan admission, 08 as well as
judicial complaint 0 9 that the processes of the National Labor
Relations Board are too slow. Therefore this is a matter to which
Congress should direct its immediate attention. One cannot with
sincerity, forcefully argue that exclusive jurisdiction resides in
the Board if the Board cannot expeditiously hear and fairly deter-
mine the rights of the parties. Perhaps a part of the solution
would be to increase the number of members on the Board to the
number recommended when the Taft-Hartley Act was enacted.
Another solution might be for Congress to enact by statute the
case law as it stands ending with the Garner decision. The ad-
vantage to be gained by this method would have to be weighed
against the stultification which usually ensues from a compre-
hensive statutory enactment. The administrative processes of
necessity have to remain flexible.
These are considerations that will have to be resolved if we
are to sustain a uniform and consistent policy pertaining to labor
relations. Jurisdictional standards issued by the Board are of
little help since they are usually indefinite in their legal effect and
because the rights and liabilities of parties should not ultimately
turn upon the dollar-volume of business. Management and labor
here have a common ground of interest, the attainment of which
they could easily reach by a united effort.
Wilbur L. Pollard
107 La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin ERB, 336 US. 18, 26 (1949).
3-0 100 CONG. Rc. 5531 (daily ed. May 3,1954).
l09 See the dissenting opinion in Garner v. Teamsters, C. & H. Union, 373
Pa. 19, 94 A.2d 893 (1953).
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